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3

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Editorial Note 295

Rüdiger Dornbusch
The New International Architecture 296–304

Hans-Werner Sinn

Risktaking, Limited Liability, and the Competition
of Bank Regulators 305–329

Ernst Baltensperger

Competition of Bank Regulators: A More Optimistic View. A
Comment on the Paper by Hans-Werner Sinn 330–335

Peter Spencer

Can National Banking Systems Compete?
A Comment on the Paper by Hans-Werner Sinn 336–339

Hans-Werner Sinn

Asymmetric Information, Bank Failures, and the Rationale
for Harmonizing Banking Regulation.
A Rejoinder on Comments of Ernst Baltensperger
and Peter Spencer 340–346

Thomas Aronsson and Tomas Sjögren

Income Taxation, Commodity Taxation and Provision of
Public Goods under Labor Market Distortions 347–370

Eric O'N. Fisher and Mark A. Roberts

Funded Pensions, Labor Market Participation,
and Economic Growth 371–386

Anna Maffioletti and Michele Santoni

Ambiguity and Partisan Business Cycles 387–406

Ann-Sofie Kolm and Birthe Larsen

Social Norm, the Informal Sector,
and Unemployment 407–424



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Risktaking, Limited Liability, and the Competition of Bank Regulators

Hans-Werner Sinn*

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalize and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these constraints may not survive in systems competition, as systems competition is likely to suffer from the same type of information asymmetry that induced the private market failure and that brought in the government in the first place (Selection Principle). As national solvency regulation creates a positive international policy externality on foreign lenders of domestic banks, there will be an undersupply of such regulation. This may explain why Asian banks were undercapitalized and took excessive risks before the banking crisis emerged. (JEL: D8, H0)

1. Systems Competition in Banking Regulation

The theory of systems competition has dealt with numerous problems, concentrating on fiscal competition with tax rates and public expenditure affecting internationally mobile factors of production. However, countries also compete with regulatory instruments, which may or may not exert policy externalities on other countries. Very little research has been done along these lines.

This paper tries to model the competition of banking regulation, which, to the best of the author's knowledge, has not found prior formal treatment in the literature.¹ One of the main functions of banking regulation is to keep the

* This paper resembles part of a book on systems competition that will be forthcoming elsewhere (Sinn 2003). The author wishes to thank Frank Westermann and Paul Kremmel for careful research assistance, and he gratefully acknowledges useful comments by Hans Degryse, Dominique Demougin, Vesa Kanninen, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, as well as three anonymous referees.

¹ I was unable to find references to such regulatory competition in the literature. However, a referee brought a paper by Gehrig (1995) to my attention that does include a useful nontechnical discussion of this issue on pp. 253 and 254. Moreover, after the present paper came out as a CESifo working paper in November 2001, I came across a mimeographed paper by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez dated December 2001, which does contain a formal model of systems competition. That paper produces a related message,

banking risks under control in order to prevent bank lenders from incurring losses on their bank bonds and bank deposits. Deposits are often insured, but bank bonds involve the full risk of bankruptcy for savers and financial investors. To limit this risk, many countries impose tough solvency rules on their banks. This paper studies the rationale for such regulation in terms of affecting banks' lending behavior and asks the question whether national bank regulators have the right incentives to regulate optimally, i.e., whether there is an "invisible hand" in systems competition that ensures the efficiency of this type of regulatory competition.

The Asian banking crisis demonstrates clearly the need for addressing this question. Foreign holders of bank bonds went on strike when they witnessed that Thai banks were issuing excessively bad bonds, and so the Thai baht depreciated strongly. With South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines the situation was no different, and the currencies of those countries soon followed similar paths, leaving a long trail of bankrupt banks behind. The Asian banking crisis propelled the Asian economies into a sharp recession in 1998, which had severe repercussions on economic growth in the rest of the world.

The Asian problems had been preceded by the savings & loan crisis in the United States and the Mexican crisis in the early 1990s. Both of these crises had a weaker impact on the world economy because they were mitigated with generous loans by the U.S. government and the IMF. However, they paved the way for the Asian disaster by making financial investors aware of the risks they were facing.

While the various banking crises had many facets that cannot be discussed here, there seems to be a common element in that the banks were undercapitalized and had taken excessive risks in the capital market. For instance, in Korea the equity asset ratio fell from 9.5% in 1990 to 6.5% in 1996, the year before the crisis began, and in Mexico the ratio fell from 6.24% in 1990 to 5.5% in 1994, the year of the crisis (OECD, 2001). There are illustrative descriptions by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Dekle and Kletzer (2001), Kane (2000), and Calomiris and Powell (2000), showing that in East Asia as well as Mexico, a substantial part of the problem had indeed been excessive risktaking and the lack of domestic bank regulation. In Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, banking regulation was fragmented between different regulatory agencies, and overall was too lenient or simply ignored in practice. In his 1998 Munich Lectures, Dornbusch (2003) argued that the Asian crisis, which had led the world into a severe recession, was the

but uses a very different formal apparatus, which is based on reduced-form behavioral functions, rather than a micro formulation of the banks' and regulators' behavior as in this paper.

result of financial fragility and excessive risktaking, which itself originated from a preceding liberalization of bank regulation and deliberate neglect of prudence regulation.²

Undercapitalization not only makes a bank vulnerable in a crisis, it can even trigger the crisis by inducing excessive risktaking when the bank enjoys the privilege of limited liability, as all corporations do. When the equity base is low, limited liability effectively truncates the probability distributions of income among which a bank can choose and thus creates an artificial type of risk-loving behavior, which has been called a gamble for resurrection or resuscitation. There is an extensive literature analyzing this type of behavior and possible policy implications in various contexts. The references include contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Sinn (1980, ch. III B, V B, and VC; 1982), Minsky (1991), Goodhard (1991, p. 15), Mishkin (1992), Rochet (1992, pp. 1157–1159), Dow (1996), Dewatripont and Tirole (1995), Gehrig (1995, 1996), Bester (1997), and Gollier, Koehl, and Rochet (1997).³

Because of the Asian banking crisis, the issue of how sound banking behavior could be assured has regained much attention in the public debate, including that between the IMF and the World Bank. Often this debate neglects the implications of the artificial incentive for risktaking, but the Basel I Accord of 1988 and the new Basel II Accord, which is currently being negotiated and is scheduled to be implemented in 2005, do reflect the concerns implied in this incentive.

The Basel Accords specify minimum equity requirements and risk assessment rules. They can be seen as reactions to the perceived failure of international systems competition in the context of banking regulation. If systems competition had functioned well, common minimum equity and risk assessment rules would not have been necessary. Instead, each country could have defined its rules unilaterally, and the international competition of such rules could then have shown which ones perform best. However, the various banking crises have created sufficiently serious doubts concerning the self-regulatory forces of international systems competition to warrant a closer scrutiny of the problem.

This paper studies the international competition of banking regulation in the context of a simple model of financial intermediation where investment banks collect funds from savers to lend them to risky enterprises.

² The macroeconomic implications are not self-evident, though. Blum and Hellwig (1995) argued that banking regulation itself tends to bring about business-cycle risks, because the solvency requirements imply particularly harsh credit constraints in a time of recession.

³ Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Hellwig and Bester (1987) referred to related phenomena when they explained why banks can avoid the opportunistic behavior of their clients by imposing credit constraints.

2. Lemon Bonds

A theoretical justification for the mistrust in systems competition can be found in the lemon problem.⁴ The potential lemon good that banks offer to their customers is bonds, the quality of these bonds being defined in terms of the probability that banks do not go bankrupt and the amount of loan repayment they can ensure even if they do.

The bank's repayment or survival probability depends on the riskiness of the investment projects chosen, and the loan repayment in the case of bankruptcy depends on the equity the bank owns. The more risk the bank takes and the lower its equity capital, the lower is the quality of the bonds it issues.

If bond purchasers could observe the bank's investment decisions and make a judgment on the appropriateness of its equity base, they would react to any kind of opportunistic bank behavior by requiring a sufficiently high rate of interest to compensate for the reduced quality of the bonds they bought or by not buying the bonds at all. The bank would then choose the bond quality that maximized its expected investment return and would not be able to increase its expected profit by further reducing the bond quality. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, i.e., imperfect visibility of an individual bank's risk choices, the bank might be able to get away with lowering the quality of the bonds more than is useful by reducing the expected value of loan repayment without having to offer a higher rate of interest in return.⁵

Such asymmetry in information is indeed realistic, because banking is an extremely sophisticated and complicated enterprise, making it hard even for members of a bank supervisory board to keep sight of the risks their bank incurs. The financial instruments that banks use for their business have become so sophisticated, and so much business is happening off the balance sheets, that the assumption of well-informed savers would be heroic if not

4 Originally the lemon problem was specified as a problem of adverse selection. However, it can also be seen as a problem of moral hazard, and that is the interpretation used in this paper. Cf. Sinn (1997).

5 In principle there are three possibilities for modeling the incentive for excessive risktaking:
(i) The party sustaining the losses has a binding contract with the firm that is sufficiently incomplete to exclude the commitment to a cautious risk strategy. Thus the firm has no incentive to act cautiously even if the party sustaining the loss perfectly foresaw its actions at the time of signing the contract.

(ii) The party sustaining the loss has no contractual relationship with the firm, and the potential loss is indivisible among a large number of disadvantaged people, so that the public-goods nature of the problem excludes private side payments along Coasian lines.

(iii) The party sustaining the loss makes a contract with the firm when or before it chooses its risk strategy, but it is unable to monitor the firm's actions.

Case (ii) can be excluded with the present analysis for obvious reasons, and case (i) because of the repeated nature and limited duration of bank loans.

absurd. It is true that savers can observe the equity base of a bank and certain other characteristics, but in order to understand what they mean, they would have to be able to monitor the banks' off-balance-sheet business and to become banking specialists. Even the close monitoring of a bank's history does not convey the necessary information, because bankruptcy is not only a rare but also a nonrepeating event. The best the bank lenders can achieve is to get some idea of the average frequency of bank failures in general and of the amounts of funds normally repaid in such events.

The knowledge of the general market situation may prevent bank lenders from being systematically expropriated by the banks, because they will require, and be able to receive, a rate of interest sufficiently high to compensate for the possibility of nonperformance. However, market knowledge does not provide the lenders with the information necessary to distinguish between good and bad banks and will therefore not be able to exclude opportunistic banking behavior. Unregulated banks may get stuck in an inefficient equilibrium, where they all choose some degree of overly risky behavior. A bank that decides to offer a safer product, i.e., a bond with a higher expected repayment value, may not be able to convey this information to its lenders and may therefore not be able to borrow at a lower rate of interest than its competitors can. Offering a safer bond would just increase its expected repayment and lower its expected profit.


To help the bank lenders make better investment decisions, private rating agencies such as Moody's or Standard & Poor's have developed systems that rank banks by the estimated safety of their business. However, as the savings & loan debacle, the Asian crisis, and the recent failure to detect the problems of Enron and WorldCom have demonstrated, these agencies are far from perfect, unable to provide the market with timely ranking revisions. Only in retrospect did the investors become aware of the true riskiness of their engagements; the rating agencies had not been able to warn them in time. The crises showed that there was still substantial scope for opportunistic behavior behind the public's back.

To protect bank lenders, often ordinary people who have entrusted their lifetime savings to the banks, many governments have imposed solvency regulations on banks or insisted on tough self-regulation rules imposed by national banking associations. Some countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, and (after the Asian crisis) Japan, have imposed very strict regulations, such as minimum legal reserves and extensive creditor rights; others, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have placed more confidence in self-regulation.⁶

⁶ Another justification for tough banking regulation can be found in the time-consistency problem first studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Banks make long-term lending con-

Whereas the national regulation decisions were normally designed in periods where the banks' lenders were predominantly nationals, globalization has changed the situation substantially. International banking competition has become fierce, possible acquisitions by competitors have become a constant threat to banking managers, and cheap international refinancing has become the clue for banking success in all countries. Banks have internationalized faster than other institutions and firms, and in many countries the share of foreigners among their lenders has increased substantially over recent years. In Germany, for example, this share doubled in the sixteen years from 1980 through 1996.⁷ Figure 1 gives an overview of the situation prevailing among a selection of OECD countries in 1996.

Figure 1
Share of Liabilities to Nonresidents in 1996



OECD (2000) Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks.

tracts with savers, and savers correctly anticipate the banks' ultimate risk choices, but the parties are unable to renegotiate when the bank considers a variation in its risktaking behavior after the contracts have been made. Banks therefore choose overly risky activities, imposing a negative marginal externality on savers. In fact, as was pointed out to me by Dominique Demouglin, it is a straightforward exercise to reinterpret the present model from such a perspective. All equations and all basic conclusions would be preserved.

- 7 A clear upward trend was observable in 12 of 16 countries for which I had data. In the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and Italy the trend was particularly pronounced. However, there were exceptions, like Holland or France, where the share remained constant during the period considered.

The increasing fraction of foreigners among the banks' lenders may change the national governments' attitudes towards banking regulation, since part of the benefits from banking regulation spills over to foreigners while domestic banks may suffer from the constraints imposed upon them. That is the theme of this paper, and we will see what theoretical basis can be laid.

3. Banking with Unlimited Liability: The Basic Model

To investigate the information asymmetry between a bank and its lenders formally, a model of a market for bank intermediation is considered. The model focuses on opportunistic behavior by the banks and abstracts from such behavior by the banks' borrowers.⁸ For didactic purposes, the analysis begins with a simplified version of the model without limited liability, and then turns to limited liability in a closed-economy context. The main focus is on the analysis of regulatory competition, which follows thereafter.

There is a capital market with four types of assets:

- (i) Safe assets with a fixed rate of return $s - 1$, such as government saving bonds.
- (ii) Bonds issued by banks, which promise, but will not necessarily pay, a rate of return $r - 1$.
- (iii) Business loans, which pay a target rate of return $q - 1$ if the business is successful, which happens with probability p , $1 > p > 0$; but pay no return and incur the total loss of capital if the business fails.
- (iv) Bank shares.

In the model, s is exogenously given, but r and q will be explained endogenously.

Private households can directly invest in the first and second types of assets, but can channel their funds into the third type only indirectly, via the intermediation of private banks, because there are prohibitive transaction costs involved in lending directly. Banks are "delegated monitors" for business investments.⁹ Only they possess the necessary information to monitor business firms and the power to enforce efficient behavior of these firms; but the banks themselves may not behave efficiently. The model concentrates on investment banking, abstracting from deposit insurance.¹⁰ There are a fixed number of competitive banks, which face an inelastic demand for funds, F ,

⁸ Nevertheless, this model is similar in spirit to an inspiring model due to Bester (1997), who studied opportunistic behavior of a bank's borrowers.

⁹ Gehrig (1995, p. 785).

¹⁰ Formally, the bonds introduced above can also be interpreted as interest-bearing deposits. Note, however, that while deposit insurance is common among OECD countries, none has insurance for bank bonds and other financial instruments that the banks use

by private firms.¹¹ The target rate-of-return factor q can be chosen by the bank by controlling the type of business investment it wants to finance. There are options with high levels of q and low success probabilities p , and vice versa. In general we assume that the set of efficient return-probability tuples available to the bank can be described by a function $p(q)$, $p' < 0$.¹² All agents are risk-neutral, and banks do not diversify their lending risks; they specialize in lending to a selected client or clients whose risks are perfectly correlated. The German *Hausbank*, which concentrates its lending on only one or a few business firms, may come close to this ideal. The risks among the clients of different banks may or may not be uncorrelated, but each of the identical competitive banks faces the same choice set of attainable probability distributions.

If the risks among the various types of business firms are uncorrelated, the lenders' risk neutrality can be justified with the assumption that they diversify their risks among the various bank bonds, and the banks' risk neutrality (with regard to the gross wealth distributions it faces) can be explained by their owners' perfect diversification among bank shares and other assets. However, as long as the assumption of risk neutrality is accepted as a simplifying device, it may also be assumed that the risks are correlated. The assumption that banks specialize in just one firm or one class of perfectly correlated risks can, in turn, be justified by prohibitive information costs or the fact that the artificial incentives for risktaking that result from limited liability and are analyzed in the following section are operative.¹³ However, this assumption is

to collect their funds. Deposits and deposit insurance are essential ingredients of savings banks, but otherwise they are of limited importance.

- ¹¹ As the analysis focuses on distortions in risk taking rather than investment decisions, F is, for simplicity, taken as given. Only the riskiness of the investment is considered a choice variable.
- ¹² There are various possible interpretations of this function: (i) There are different potential firms, each with a different project (or one firm with different potential projects), characterized by p and q . The function $p(q)$ characterizes the true social efficiency frontier. The bank picks the firm it likes (or agrees with the managers of the firm which one to pick). (ii) The bank contracts with a particular firm whose behavior it cannot monitor, and $p(q)$ is a reduced form of behavioral response function reflecting the Stiglitz–Weiss relationship. This second interpretation would be compatible with the positive results derived below, but the welfare results would have to be interpreted with more caution. The focus in this paper is on the information asymmetry between a bank and its lenders rather than between a bank and its borrowers.
- ¹³ The nondiversification assumption has the advantage of making it possible to model a simple risk–return trade-off and is made for the sake of analytical simplification only. The main thrust of the analysis to follow is independent of this simplification as long as the tails of the probability distributions involved extend to the negative equity range so that limited liability becomes effective. See Sinn (1980) for an extensive study of $\mu - \sigma$ choice problems with limited liability and linear distribution classes. Limited liability implies that the indifference curves in $\mu - \sigma$ space are concave when the true degree of risk

a simplification only, to prevent us from considering risk choices among more complicated probability distributions. None of the messages of this paper hinges on this simplification. Consider first the case of unlimited liability, where banks will always keep their promises. Here, bank bonds are safe assets, and arbitrage in the capital market assures that they generate the same return as government bonds:

$$s = r. \quad (1)$$

Consider a representative bank. The expected profit of the bank choosing a project with a target return of size q is

$$E \pi = (p(q)q - r) \cdot F. \quad (2)$$

The optimal risk strategy maximizes the expected return from business lending. It is given by the return-probability tuple at which the marginal expected revenue from business lending is zero:

$$p'(q)q + p(q) = 0. \quad (3)$$

It is assumed that, in the optimum, $E\pi > 0$.

4. Lemon Banking

In the model set up thus far, bonds are not lemon goods, because unlimited bank liability ensures that the lender gets exactly what the bank promises. However, unlimited liability is far from being realistic, given that no one can lose more than he has. If the bank's equity capital is exhausted, bank lenders will not be able to collect the promised return, and they may even lose part of the loan capital they provided.

Let C be the equity capital the bank owns at the beginning of the period, and assume it is required by a regulatory agency to invest this capital at the safe rate of return $s - 1$, and uses the proceeds from bond issues, F , for the business investment it finances.¹⁴ If the business project is successful, the bank

aversion is sufficiently small or the legal probability distributions of wealth extend far enough into the negative range, which may be the case when the bank's investment in risky assets exceeds its equity capital. Concave indifference curves clearly imply that the bank prefers not to diversify its risks.

¹⁴ It would be possible to allow the firm to invest part of F , say Δ , $\Delta \geq 0$, in the safe asset without changing any of the results, because the firm would always choose $\Delta = 0$. Consider the two cases where (i) the limited-liability constraint is not binding and where (ii) it is binding. In case (i), $\Delta = 0$ follows from the assumption made in the text, that, in the optimum, $E\pi = (p(q)q - r)F > 0$. In case (ii), when the limited-liability constraint is binding, the bank value will be $sC + q(F - \Delta) - rF + s\Delta = sC + (q - r)F - (q - s)\Delta$. Thus $\Delta = 0$ is optimal if $q > s$. To show that this condition is satisfied, note first that if case (i) with $E\pi > 0$ prevails, the assumption $p > 0$ and equation (1) imply that $q > s$. Anticipating the result yet to be derived that limiting liability implies an even higher value of q (Proposition 1), it follows *a fortiori* that $q > s$ and that $\Delta = 0$.

will be able to service the bonds it issued, and its value will be $s \cdot C + (q - r)F$. If, on the other hand, the business project fails, the value of the bank will be $sC - rF$ or 0, whichever is higher. Multiplying the possible states of bank value with their probabilities and subtracting the end-of-period value of the initial equity capital gives the following expression for the representative bank's expected profit:

$$E\pi = p(q) (sC + (q - r) \cdot F) + (1 - p(q)) \cdot \max (sC - rF, 0) - sC. \quad (4)$$

If the bank's equity capital exceeds its repayment obligation ($sC > rF$), this expression coincides with (2). The limited-liability constraint is not binding, and the same type of equilibrium emerges as was discussed above. If, on the other hand, the bank's equity is insufficient to satisfy its repayment obligation ($sC < rF$), limited liability creates an artificial risk preference that may change the bank's behavior. This is the case on which the subsequent analysis will concentrate.

The rate of return promised to lenders may not be given, but may depend on the actions of the bank. Lenders will know from their general market observation that the repayment promise of banks cannot be taken for granted. Thus the promised rate of return on bank bonds will have to be sufficiently high to compensate for the reduced payment in the case of bankruptcy. Risk neutrality implies that a capital-market equilibrium is characterized by the equality between the expected repayment of a bank bond and the repayment of a safe asset. As the repayment of a bank bond is equal to the bank's promise in the case of success and equal to its equity capital in the case of failure, the equilibrium condition can be taken to be

$$p(q) \cdot rF + (1 - p(q)) \cdot sC = sF \quad \text{for } rF \geq sC. \quad (5)$$

The important question is, whether and to what extent the constraint imposed by equation (5) will affect the behavior of banks. The answer depends on which of two possible interpretations of this equation, a narrow one or a wide one, is correct. The narrow one is that equation (5) applies to an individual bank's actions and shows how the lender's required rate of interest reacts to the bank's policy choices. The wide interpretation is that equation (5) is only an equilibrium condition, determining the market rate of interest paid by banks without implying that the single bank can affect this rate through its own policy decisions.

If the narrow interpretation is true, limited liability will have no behavioral implications relative to the model set up in the previous section. Inserting equation (5) into (4) gives again equation (2) when account is taken of (1), and this is true even if there is limited liability. As the bank is unable to manipulate the expected rate of interest paid to its lenders, this rate being equal to the one on safe assets, $s - 1$, it will still aim at maximizing the expected return from business lending, as is ensured by marginal condition (3).

However, for the reasons explained in section 2, the extent of household information on the bank's actions may not go far enough to justify the narrow interpretation. If bank lenders are unable to monitor the individual bank's actions *ex ante* and are therefore unable to anticipate these actions with an appropriate interest demand, the bank's decision problem is no longer compatible with maximization of equation (2), because the bank does not have to alter the promised rate of return, $r - 1$, when it changes its risk policy, given that the other banks stick to whatever policies they choose. To understand the bank's incentives in the case of constant r and the limited-liability constraint being operative, rewrite equation (4) in the form

$$E\pi = (p(q) \cdot q - r)F + (rF - sC)(1 - p(q)) \quad \text{for } rF \geq sC \quad (6)$$

and compare with equation (2). The first term on the right-hand side is the expected profit provided that the bank services its bonds under all circumstances. However, the second term measures the advantage resulting from the fact that the bank does not fully service its bonds under all circumstances but only in the case of survival. In the case of bankruptcy the bank can avoid that part of the promised loan repayment that exceeds its equity capital, $rF - sC$, and this advantage contributes to the expected profit to the extent of the probability that it happens, $1 - p(q)$. There is a negative marginal externality imposed on the bank's lenders, which may distort the bank's decisions.

The single bank will try to maximize (6) for a given r , notwithstanding the fact that r is determined by the equilibrium condition (5). The bank's choice variables are the target return in the case of success, q [including the corresponding success probability $p(q)$] and the amount of equity capital, C . Assuming that equity capital is constrained from below by a solvency requirement imposed by a regulator such that $C \geq \varepsilon \geq 0$, the Lagrangian of the bank's decision problem can be written as

$$L = (p(q) \cdot q - r)F + (rF - sC)(1 - p(q)) + \lambda(C - \varepsilon) \quad \text{for } rF \geq sC,$$

where λ is the Kuhn–Tucker multiplier. The resulting optimality conditions are

$$p'(q)qF + p(q)F - p'(q)(rF - sC) = 0 \quad \text{for } rF \geq sC, \quad (7)$$

$$\lambda = s(1 - p(q)), \quad (8)$$

and

$$\lambda \cdot (C - \varepsilon) = 0. \quad (9)$$

A comparison between optimality conditions (3) and (7) reveals that the bank's risk choices are indeed distorted. The first two terms in (7) give the marginal expected revenue from seeking a higher rate of return. With

unlimited liability they sum to zero, since the bank goes to the point where the increase in the target rate of return from business investment is outweighed by the corresponding reduction in the probability of success. With limited liability this policy is no longer optimal, since increasing the target rate of return has the additional advantage that the state of nature where the lenders will have to satisfy themselves with the bank's equity capital, sC , rather than the promised repayment rF , becomes more probable, the marginal increase in the probability being measured by $-p'(q)$.

The bank's optimum now lies beyond the point of maximum expected revenue from business lending, because there is a negative marginal externality it can impose on its lenders by reducing the probability of success. Given the expected return from business investment, a high target return that accrues with a low probability is better than a low target return with a high probability, because the expected loan repayment is lower. Thus, choosing a lower survival probability and a higher target return may be better for the bank, even if this implies a somewhat lower expected return to business lending. This is the gamble for resurrection analyzed in the literature cited in the introduction and analyzed in great detail under the term *BLOOS rule* (you cannot get blood out of a stone) in Sinn (1980).


Figure 2 illustrates the distortion in the bank's decision problem. The upper of the two downward-sloping curves is the graph of the function $p(q)$, i.e., the probability of successful business lending as a function of the target return factor; and the lower one shows the bank's marginal expected revenue from business lending. Formally, the relationship between the two curves is similar to that between a demand curve and a marginal revenue curve, but of course, this is nothing but a formal similarity. The point of maximum expected revenue is where the expected marginal revenue curve cuts the abscissa, A , but the bank's optimum is where the expected marginal revenue is sufficiently negative to compensate for the advantage of being able to impose a negative marginal externality on its lenders. In the diagram this marginal externality is measured by the distance between the abscissa and the horizontal line below it. Thus the point of intersection between this line and the marginal expected revenue curve, C , is the firm's optimum in the case where the limited-liability constraint is operative.

While there is an interior optimum for the bank's risk choice, there is a corner solution for its equity capital. As equation (8) reveals that λ is positive, it follows from (9) that

$$C = \varepsilon; \tag{10}$$

i.e., the bank will choose as little equity as possible for its operations. The higher the equity capital, the higher is the payment to lenders in the case of failure, and the higher is the expected refinancing cost. Clearly, therefore,

Figure 2
The Bank's Optimal Risk Choice with Limited Liability



the bank prefers to operate with as little equity as is allowed and takes only the quantity it must.

The result contradicts the Modigliani–Miller theorem, according to which a firm’s debt–equity choice is indeterminate.¹⁵ However, that theorem was derived by abstracting from limited liability and asymmetric information. In the present context, equity capital is more expensive than debt capital for the banking firm, since an increase of equity capital increases the payments to lenders in the case of bankruptcy, which ignorant lenders will not honor with a lower interest requirement.¹⁶ From a practical perspective, the fact that equity capital is much more expensive than debt capital is obvious for any banking business. Bank managers are eager to spare equity capital whenever they can and to run their banks with as little equity as possible, certainly far less than necessary to be able to cover all the risks they incur.

The result of this section can be summarized as follows.

¹⁵ Modigliani (1961 and 1982) and Miller (1977).

¹⁶ Relative to the true social opportunity cost, equity capital is too expensive in this model, and debt capital is too cheap. In an extended model with deposit insurance whose premium is not adjusted to individual behavior, debt capital may *a fortiori* be too cheap due to the externality imposed on other insurees.

Proposition 1 The combination of limited liability and incomplete information of its lenders induces the banks to minimize their equity volumes and to choose riskier strategies of business lending than in the case of unlimited liability. Banks choose to offer their lenders lemon bonds, which will not be serviced with certainty.

5. Welfare Implications and Optimal Regulation

From a social perspective, the bank's risktaking is excessive. It is true that risktaking often is productive in the sense that it enables people to make use of the opportunities nature offers them. Risk-consolidating devices such as insurance and stock markets can be seen as augmenting risk as one of the economy's most important factors of production and to have significant growth effects.¹⁷ However, in the present context, risktaking may be excessive because it is induced by an externality that the bank imposes on its lenders rather than a consolidating activity.

Assume that s measures the true social opportunity cost of bank lending, that q and 0 denote the true social returns from business lending in the cases of success and failure, and that the probability p is both the subjective and the objective probability of success. Then welfare W is given by the difference between the expected social return of business lending and the alternative return that savers could have earned had they invested their funds in the capital market:

$$W = (p(q)q - s) \cdot F. \quad (11)$$

The optimal amount of risktaking (as measured by the target return) and the optimal success probability follow from the first-order condition for a maximum of (11),

$$p'(q)q + p(q) = 0. \quad (12)$$

Obviously, it coincides with the bank's optimum in the case of unlimited liability, as defined by equation (3).

The social optimum is given by point A in Figure 2. The welfare loss from choosing point C instead of A is given by the shaded area ABC between the marginal-expected-revenue curve and the abscissa. The area shows by how much the expected revenue from business lending declines due to the banks' attempts to reduce the expected loan repayment to its lenders.

Interestingly enough, the banks burn their own fingers with this policy, because it is they alone who bear the welfare loss resulting from their opportunistic behavior. Because of (5), lenders will be able to receive a fair

¹⁷ Sinn (1986).

compensation for the bankruptcy risk in market equilibrium. The welfare loss shows up exclusively in terms of a reduction of bank profits and hence a corresponding decline in the value of banking firms. Households suffer no loss although they buy the lemon bonds.

The irony of the result can be seen most clearly in Figure 2. Suppose, for a moment, all banks choose point A. By moving from A to C, the single bank can increase its profit by an amount given by the area ACD, because it reduces its expected loan repayment to its lenders by an amount equal to the area ABCD, which is more than the decline in the expected return from business investment, ABC. However, if all banks behave that way, different lending conditions will emerge where the banks' lenders will be able to fully avoid a disadvantage. If all banks operate at point C instead of A, they are unable to reduce the expected loan repayment, and hence their profits fall by the area ABC. This can be summarized as follows.

Proposition 2 The risktaking resulting from limited liability and asymmetric information is too large from a welfare perspective. The welfare loss will be borne by the banks alone and result in reduced banking profits.

The remedy to cure the market failure is some sort of collective action that imposes constraints on the single bank's behavior. This could be an agreement among the banks, or it could be banking laws that exclude misbehavior. The national solutions differ in this regard. There are a multitude of constraints that the countries impose on their banks, but the imposition of bank solvency rules in the sense of setting minimum equity requirements seems to be common to all major countries.

The model set up above shows that this is indeed a useful approach, since it includes ϵ as the minimum amount of equity capital required by a bank regulator. From equations (7) and (10) it follows that it is possible to reduce opportunistic behavior by increasing this minimum. The higher ϵ , the lower is the marginal externality distorting the bank's behavior, and the lower is the extent of risktaking as represented by the size of the target return:

$$\frac{dq}{d\epsilon} = \frac{-p'(q) \cdot s}{d^2E\pi/dq^2} < 0 \quad \text{for } rF \geq s\epsilon. \tag{13}$$

Here

$$\frac{d^2E\pi}{dq^2} = 2p'(q)F + p''(q) ((q - r)F + s\epsilon) < 0 \quad \text{for } rF \geq s\epsilon$$

is the second-order condition for the bank's optimization problem, which is assumed to be satisfied. It is even possible to induce firms to behave optimally. If $s\epsilon \geq rF$, it follows from (7) that there is no distortion at all, because the

equity capital is large enough to prevent the limited-liability constraint from becoming operative.¹⁸ This can be summarized as follows.

Proposition 3 With the imposition of minimum equity requirements it is possible to reduce and even avoid the welfare loss from excessive risktaking that is implied by limited liability.

6. The Competition of Banking Regulation

While it is in the national, and even the national banks', interest to impose minimum equity requirements when all competing banks are governed by them, things may be different, of course, in an international context. Although the banks themselves have tended to lobby for strict national banking rules, their interest in such rules has been fading away with the rapid globalization of recent years. The argument used by banking representatives is that the unilateral imposition of tough banking rules is unfair, since these rules increase the national cost of the banking business and imply a competitive disadvantage relative to the rest of the world.

The argument would make little sense if it could be assumed that international lenders reward tough national banking laws by sufficing themselves with lower rates of interest, knowing that the bonds they buy have a higher quality than those of other countries. But obviously, the banking representatives do not believe that international lenders behave this way. While it is true that the refinancing rates differ to some degree according to the assessment of the rating agencies, there is the widespread fear that the observable differences by no means reflect the true differences of the risks imposed on lenders. The bank lobbies' pressure on national governments not to impose stricter banking rules than do competing countries is therefore overwhelming, and in fact the pressure goes in the direction of national liberalization.¹⁹ The Asian banking crisis, which in the opinion of many observers resulted

¹⁸ Under realistic conditions, the bank's probability distribution has a very long but thin lower tail. To ensure that this tail lies completely in the range of positive legal wealth levels, a very large equity stock could be necessary, but such a strict interpretation of the model would make little sense. If only part of the tail of the probability distribution lies in the range of negative legal wealth and if the firm is risk-averse in principle, the firm's risk preferences may still be fairly normal and may not imply a pathological degree of risktaking: despite the possibility of negative legal wealth, indifference curves in $\mu - \sigma$ space may be positively sloped in the relevant range. See Sinn (1980, chapter III, section B1). Thus, in practice, it would be enough to require an equity stock that avoids the artificial incentive for risktaking, i.e., one that limits the choice set to the range where the indifference curve slope is positive.

¹⁹ Once again, reference to Gehrig's (1995) discussion of this phenomenon is appropriate here.

from financial fragility and could have been prevented with stricter banking laws, may have been the result of a competition of laxity in regulation.

Suppose for a moment that this view were wrong and that bank lenders were able to assess the meaning of national banking laws even though they are unable to monitor a single bank's risktaking behavior. In this case, lenders from at home and abroad would be able to infer from the national banking law which target rate of return and which success probability the domestic banks will choose, and they would use equation (5) to determine the rate of interest they require from the banks of a particular country. The national government would then likely take the behavior of savers and banks into account when choosing its banking law. As national and international savers would receive an expected rate of return equal to the given world market rate of interest for safe assets, $s - 1$, the government's policy choice would be irrelevant for households, but would affect the national banks' profit. National welfare maximization would therefore be identical with the profit maximization of a single bank with well-informed lenders. Integrating (5) into (6) would result in equation (11), and obviously it would be in the national government's interest to induce the domestic banks, by way of setting ε , to choose a target return that satisfies (12) and to maximize the expected return from business lending.

Though logically possible, this scenario is not really convincing, since it contradicts the Selection Principle.²⁰ The Selection Principle says that it is unlikely that systems competition will work, since governments have concentrated on those economic activities where markets have failed. Reintroducing the markets through the back door of systems competition is likely to bring about the same kind of market failure that induced the governments to become active in the first place. In the present context, the Selection Principle could imply not only that international bank lenders are unable to assess a single bank's choices under risk, but also that they cannot easily distinguish between the various national banking laws. There are currently 205 countries in the world, and there are nearly as many banking laws. To assume that savers know what they will get if they entrust their money to a bank in Fiji Islands, Madagascar, or Turkmenistan would be sanguine to say the least.

Thus, the situation of a national government may be similar to that of a single bank that faces ignorant lenders. If the government imposes a tough banking law that prevents or reduces opportunistic banking behavior, it will not be able to convince lenders of the better quality of national bank bonds and will therefore not be able to reduce the rate of interest that the lenders request. The government will therefore have to take into account that the imposition of a minimum equity requirement makes domestic banks worse

²⁰ See Sinn (1997).

off and their lenders better off. If it were equally interested in both bank profits and the well-being of lenders, it would impose an equity requirement sufficient to satisfy the closed-economy welfare maximum as defined by (12). However, given that many lenders come from abroad, it certainly is not that impartial.

Being elected by domestic residents, the domestic government will only take their situation into account and neglect foreigners, thus imposing a policy externality on other countries. In principle, there can be foreign bank owners and foreign lenders. Thus there may be two types of policy externality. The first one results from asymmetric information and is inflicted on foreign bondholders; it is basically the lemon externality analyzed in the context of the introductory banking model, although it now results from the national regulatory choice. The other one results from a sequencing or time-inconsistency effect similar to the one analyzed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). It is inflicted on the bank's foreign shareholders who bought the shares knowing that they would have to bear the consequences of subsequent policy changes without being able to require a differential compensation. The asymmetry among these policy externalities reflects the fact that bank securities will be revolved regularly while shares are eternal contracts. Bank bonds are therefore assumed to be bought after, or simultaneously with, the government regulation decision, and shares are assumed to be bought before.

Let α be the share of domestic residents among the people lending to domestic banks, and β the share of the domestic banks owned by domestic residents. Using the expected utility of bank lenders,

$$EU = prF + (1 - p)s\varepsilon - sF \quad \text{for } rF \geq s\varepsilon,$$

and, from (4), the expected profit,

$$E\pi = p(q - r)F - (1 - p)s\varepsilon \quad \text{for } rF \geq s\varepsilon,$$

the national welfare in the open economy can be written as

$$W = \alpha EU + \beta E\pi.$$

The competitive government will try to maximize W by choosing its policy parameter ε (the required minimum equity) appropriately. The government knows from (4) that a marginal variation of ε will affect the market outcome when $s\varepsilon \leq rF$ but not when $s\varepsilon > rF$. Taking account of the national banks' profit-maximizing reaction to a change in ε as given by (13), the government calculates the derivative of national welfare with regard to its policy parameter:

$$\frac{dW}{d\varepsilon} = (\alpha - \beta)(1 - p)s + \alpha \left. \frac{dq}{d\varepsilon} \right|_{(13)} \left[p'(q)(rF - s\varepsilon) + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{dE\pi}{dq} \right],$$

which simplifies to

$$\frac{dW}{d\varepsilon} = (\alpha - \beta)(1 - p)s + \alpha \left. \frac{dq}{d\varepsilon} \right|_{(13)} p'(q)(rF - s\varepsilon), \quad (14)$$

since $dE\pi/dq = 0$ will hold in the bank's optimum as defined by (7)–(9).

Equation (14) shows that the sign of the derivative of national welfare with regard to the required minimum equity depends on two terms. The first one represents the redistribution from banks to lenders that is brought about by a marginal increase in the equity requirement, given the bankruptcy probability $1 - p$. If the share of domestic lenders exceeds the share of domestic bank owners ($\alpha > \beta$), this welfare effect will be positive, but it is negative if the share of domestic bank owners is larger, i.e., $\alpha < \beta$. The second term reflects the fact that a higher equity requirement induces the banks to take fewer risks, i.e., to reduce the target return q and the corresponding bankruptcy probability $1 - p$. This helps the domestic lenders to the extent that the banks' equity capital falls short of the promised loan repayment ($s\varepsilon < rF$) and to the extent that there are such lenders as measured by α . In principle, banks are hurt by a similar effect, but, at the margin, and in the banks' optimum, the disadvantage is exactly outweighed by the increase in the expected return from business lending. So only the effect on lenders has a net impact on national welfare.

The overall impact on national welfare of an increase of ε is ambiguous, depending on the factors mentioned. Consider a few special cases, which all refer to the range where the limited-liability constraint is operative, i.e., $0 \leq \varepsilon \leq rF/s$.

(i) There are no domestic lenders and no foreign bank owners:

$$\alpha = 0, \beta = 1 \Rightarrow \frac{dW}{d\varepsilon} = (1 - p)s < 0 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_{opt} = 0.$$

The competitive government does not impose any equity requirements on banking firms.

(ii) There are only domestic lenders and only foreign bank owners:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha = 1, \beta = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{dW}{d\varepsilon} &= (1 - p)s + \left. \frac{dq}{d\varepsilon} \right|_{(13)} p'(q)(rF - s\varepsilon) > 0 \\ &\Rightarrow \varepsilon_{opt} \geq \frac{rF}{s}. \end{aligned}$$

The competitive government imposes an equity requirement large enough so that the banks can always keep their repayment promises.

(iii) Both domestic resident shares are positive, but the share of domestic lenders is at least as large as that of domestic bank owners. In this case, the first term in (14) is nonnegative and the second is strictly positive as long as

$s\varepsilon < rF$. It follows that

$$\alpha \geq \beta > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{dW}{d\varepsilon} > 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \varepsilon > \frac{rF}{s} \Rightarrow \varepsilon_{opt} \geq \frac{rF}{s}.$$

Once again it is optimal for the national government to impose an equity requirement large enough so that the banks will be able to repay their loans even in the case of bankruptcy.

(iv) Suppose finally that the share of domestic lenders is positive, smaller than the share of domestic bank owners, and large enough to make sure that $\alpha dq/d\varepsilon|_{(13)} p'(q)rF > (\beta - \alpha)(1 - p)s$, i.e., the second term in (14) outweighs the first one when $\varepsilon = 0$. This is the case of an interior solution, because $dW/d\varepsilon > 0$ when $\varepsilon = 0$ and $dW/d\varepsilon < 0$ when $\varepsilon = rF/s$. From the first-order condition $dW/d\varepsilon = 0$ we get, after a few manipulations,

$$0 < \alpha < \beta \Rightarrow \varepsilon_{opt} = \frac{rF}{s} - \left(\frac{\beta}{\alpha} - 1 \right) \frac{1 - p}{p'(q) \frac{dq}{d\varepsilon} \Big|_{(13)}}, \quad \text{where} \quad 0 < \varepsilon_{opt} < rF/s.$$

The national government imposes some regulation on the banks, but remains nevertheless too lax to completely prevent the limited-liability constraint from becoming operative and inducing banks to take more risks than in the case of informed lenders or unlimited liability.

It is not entirely clear which of these cases prevails most frequently in reality. However, it seems that the cases where banks are predominantly owned by nationals and borrow funds worldwide are particularly relevant. While comparative international statistics are not available, the example of Germany confirms this impression. Foreigners possess only a little more than 3% of the existing equity capital of German financial institutions,²¹ but they hold 17% of the German banks' outstanding bonds and liabilities (see Figure 1).

When bank bonds are more widely distributed internationally than bank shares, systems competition may be described by the interior solution of case (iv) or may even be close to case (i), so that a corner solution with $\varepsilon = 0$ prevails. Both cases characterize lax regulatory behavior of national authorities. In fact, the regulation will be *too* lax, for it is clear that the national regulatory optimum for the closed economy that results from $\varepsilon \geq rF/s$ and was characterized with (12) is also the optimum for the whole world. A Proposition summarizes the results.

Proposition 4 International competition among bank regulators will not, in general, be efficient when regulators maximize national welfare, lenders are unable to monitor bank behavior, and there are foreigners among the lenders and/or

²¹ According to the Bundesbank, foreigners hold Euro 9 billion of equity and direct participations. This is 3.2% of the total stock of equity reported by the OECD.

bank owners whose preferences are not taken into account by the regulators. If the share of domestic residents among the bank's owners exceeds the share of domestic residents among the bank's lenders, regulation will be too lax in the sense that national authorities do not, or do not fully, exclude the opportunistic risktaking behavior resulting from the limited-liability constraint.

Again the different roles of lenders and firm owners and the nature of the effects imposed upon them must be emphasized. The effect on foreign lenders results from asymmetric information and the inability of these lenders to recognize variations in the risk of repayment. It is independent of the time period for which the bonds are issued and arises even with short-term securities issued repeatedly by the banks. The effect on the bank's foreign owners instead results from the mere fact that an ownership title is a permanent link to a firm, which then inevitably implies that the owners are affected by regulatory changes. It is possible that the profit implications of such changes were anticipated by foreigners before they acquired shares of a bank. In that case, these implications will have been capitalized in share prices and the foreigners will just earn the normal rate of return on their ownership titles. However, this is irrelevant for the regulator's incentives, as long as he cannot commit to a regulatory policy before the foreigners buy the shares. Whatever was anticipated in the share price, the regulator will know that foreigners are affected by marginal variations in his policy according to the size of the foreign share ownership then prevailing, $1 - \beta$, and this will distort his policy choice as modeled above. It would not even matter if foreigners could sell the bank shares after a policy move, because the profit consequences would then certainly be capitalized in share prices and not affect the returns that purchasers could earn.

Things are different when policymakers can commit themselves to a certain regulatory policy before bank shares are bought by foreigners. In that case, all profit implications even of marginal decisions will accrue to domestic residents only, and in the above model it would be necessary to set $\beta = 1$ to depict this case. This would mean that either case (iv) applies with a lower interior value of ε or there is a corner solution with $\varepsilon = 0$, similar to case (i). The concern that systems competition will result in overly lax regulation would be strengthened. In general, what counts is the share of domestic residents among the banks' owners at the time the regulatory decisions are made or firmly announced, and this is how the parameter β should be interpreted.

7. The Basel Committee and EU on the Right Track

You cannot get blood out of a stone. This wisdom explains why decisionmaking under risk is often distorted in the direction of excessive risktaking when

decisionmakers face possible losses, whose size exceeds their wealth or that part of their wealth that will be made liable for compensation. A bank's loan repayment liability is an example of this. When banks can choose between high target returns in business lending that occur with a low probability and low ones that occur with a high probability, they may prefer the high target returns even though a lower expected return results. The reason for this type of risk preference is that a higher probability of bankruptcy means a higher probability that ignorant lenders who are unable to monitor the bank's actions will not be able to collect the promised repayment. Lenders buy lemon goods, and banks enjoy lower financing costs.

To avoid a market for lemon bonds, national governments usually impose solvency constraints on domestic banks. However, in the process of globalization, where an increasing fraction of the banks' lenders come from abroad, the incentive for the national governments to impose tough solvency constraints diminishes, since part of the benefits of such constraints accrues to foreigners while a comparatively large fraction of the resulting increase in banking costs is borne by domestic residents. Thus there is the risk that systems competition will in fact be a competition of laxity where the problem of lemon bonds, which brought in the national governments in the first place, reappears on the international level.

In such a situation, an international harmonization of solvency requirements seems appropriate. As mentioned in the introduction, more than a decade ago, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988) introduced its capital accord known as Basel I. Since then, the business of banking, risk management practices, supervisory approaches, and financial markets each have undergone significant transformation, and many of the old provisions have proved to be no longer adequate. Thus, in June 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a proposal for a new bank capital adequacy framework, Basel II, to replace Basel I. At this writing, the consultation process is still under way, and it is expected that the new accord will be applicable not before the year 2005.²²

The rationale for the Basel II Accord can be summarized as aiming at more flexibility and more risk sensitivity with regard to individual loans given out to private business. Banks have more choices, but they have to evaluate their borrowers more carefully and to underlay each individual loan with a specific amount of equity, depending on the risk class to which the borrower belongs. There is more emphasis on the combination of effective bank-level management, market discipline, and supervision, in contrast to the focus on the single risk measure that was used in Basel I. Basel II intends to provide

²² See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) for the details of the latest proposal.

approaches that are both more comprehensive and more sensitive to risks than Basel I, while maintaining the overall minimum equity requirement of an 8% ratio of equity capital to risk-weighted assets. Unlike before, however, external credit assessments will be used to properly evaluate the true risk of business lending.

Basel II also aims at bolstering market discipline through enhanced disclosure by banks. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants can better understand banks' risk profiles and the adequacy of their capital positions. It reduces the lemon problem discussed in this section by informing lenders about the true risks they incur, thus helping systems competition to function better than it otherwise would do. However, the authors of Basel II certainly do not believe in a liberal approach where disclosure is all that is needed to avoid the asymmetric information among lenders and regulatory authorities that is the cause of the welfare loss resulting from systems competition.

The review of Basel I complements a review already underway of EU legislation on bank capital requirements to shape a new EU capital adequacy framework. The revised EU bank capital legislation is supposed to replace the existing legislation on capital requirements, which basically has been in place since 1988.²³ The aim of the revision is to ensure that European banks and investment firms are able to respond quickly to market changes and to guarantee both financial stability and the smooth functioning of the internal market in financial services. The EU proposal also focuses on minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process, and an emphasis on market discipline.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the European Commission want to create a new global capital framework that guarantees greater stability of the international financial system by better reflecting the changes in financial markets in recent years. By cooperating closely and by coordinating the timing of the review processes, both institutions ensure that the harmonization rules do not contradict but rather complement one another. Basically, the policy response coincides with the recommendations following from the theoretical analysis of this chapter. Rather than relying on unbridled systems competition, collective international action is taken to avoid the welfare losses from lemon banking that otherwise might occur.

It should not be overlooked, though, that both the Basel and the EU approaches suffer from a lack of enforcement possibilities for countries not directly involved. The original Basel agreement was a voluntary commitment by the G-10 countries, and Basel II is a voluntary agreement backed by

²³ See Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions.

13 countries. The EU rules will be binding for all 15 EU countries, which will have to adjust their banking laws accordingly. Other countries, in particular Latin American and Asian countries, cannot be forced to obey the rules if they do not want to. In total only 19 out of 206 countries in the world have committed themselves.²⁴ How the other countries will react and whether this number is enough to make systems competition workable remains to be seen.

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²⁴ The participating countries are the EU countries, Canada, the U.S., Japan, and Switzerland.

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Competition of Bank Regulators: A More Optimistic View

A Comment on the Paper by Hans-Werner Sinn

Ernst Baltensperger

1. Introduction

The main objective of Hans-Werner Sinn's contribution (Sinn 2003) is to analyze system competition in bank regulation. He presents a very pessimistic view of such competition, arguing that it cannot work properly and will result in a level of regulation that is too lax relative to what would be socially desirable (a "race to the bottom"). Sinn's analysis is based on a model of credit and banking with asymmetric information and limited liability. The first half of his paper presents a formal restatement of a result well known from the literature, namely that limited liability and asymmetric information distort banks' risk choices, providing an incentive for banks to finance overly risky investments and choose too little equity capital (the *gamble-for-resurrection* argument). Sinn (1980) himself had extensively analyzed the *gamble-for-resurrection* argument in his book on economic decisions under uncertainty. The imposition of capital requirements by national governments is a well-known remedy for dealing with this problem. However, Sinn argues, these regulations will not survive in a globalized economy under system competition. A national solvency regulation is said to create a positive international policy externality on foreign lenders of domestic banks, inducing national regulators to choose a level of regulation that is too low (an undersupply of regulation).

By trying to model system competition in the context of bank regulation, Sinn takes up a highly topical and interesting issue, and he is to be commended for this. Indeed, analysis of system competition in bank regulation so far has mostly been restricted to verbal discussions,¹ with a formal treatment of the issue still lacking. Regretfully, I find Sinn's analysis of the issue quite unconvincing.

¹ See, e.g. Kane (1991), pp. 334–336, Baltensperger and Behrends (1994), pp. 296–298, or Gehrig (1995), pp. 753–554.

2. Observation of Differences in National Regulations

Sinn argues that the same mechanisms that lead to excessive risktaking in the national context will also prevent competition among national regulatory authorities from working properly. This hinges, as in the national context, on the lack of ability on the part of bank lenders to differentiate between different bank product qualities. But, while in the national context this refers to lenders' ability to differentiate between activity structures and risk profiles of individual banks, which is difficult indeed, in the case of international system competition it refers to the ability to differentiate between different national regulatory regimes. It seems to me that differences in national standards in banking regulation are difficult to hide and can fairly easily be revealed to bank lenders by financial specialists, rating agencies, and the financial press.

In its most general form, Sinn's argument says that, since governments tend to engage in those activities that cannot be handled satisfactorily by competitive markets (his "selection principle"; see Sinn 1997), we cannot expect that reintroducing a market through system competition will work. Rather, he argues, system competition will bring about the same kind of market failure that justified government intervention in the first place. In my view, this argument suggests a questionable and unconvincing analogy and is not applicable to the present case. Asymmetric information as a basis of an externality and allocative inefficiency may be convincing at the national or individual-bank level. Monitoring activity structures and risk profiles of individual banks is very difficult, given today's importance of off-balance-sheet activities and availability of market instruments allowing bank portfolio adjustments at a moment's notice. (Still, the benefits of enhanced transparency and disclosure rules should not be totally discounted.) At the international level, though, the issue is a completely different one. Public laws and regulations cannot be hidden, nor do they change very frequently in an unforeseeable way. Their degree of enforcement can be monitored by interested specialists. Admittedly, attempts to exploit legal formulations and corresponding evasion and circumvention activities may occur and develop over time. But resulting patterns can be observed and do not change overnight. So an alleged externality would have to have another source, one that is not revealed by Sinn.

Thus, I find it rather difficult to believe that markets should not be able to price such risk differentials more or less adequately. It is true that international lenders and markets did not appropriately discriminate among banks and countries in the 1990s. But this has, in all likelihood, much more to do with expectations that national authorities and the international community (e.g., through the IMF) would come to help and bail out ailing borrowers in case of imminent danger than with lack of information (an alternative, and

basically equally important reason for adverse risk incentives, which makes no appearance in Sinn's discussion).

If we allow for the possibility that regulation (up to a point) has benefits, and that these benefits are, at least to a certain extent, recognizable to bank lenders, there is no obvious reason why the winner in a deregulation race will be the country with the most relaxed standard.

There can be little doubt that reputations for tough, or weak, regulatory standards can be established over time. Succumbing to the temptation to exploit the advantage resulting from a low regulatory standard may have high long-run costs in terms of reputation. This may explain why a country like Switzerland, which according to Sinn's analysis should probably have a low level of regulation, exhibits one of the internationally toughest standards in capital adequacy regulation. By simply not allowing for this possibility, Sinn's analysis takes a biased view of regulatory-system competition. So, while I find his analysis to be technically correct, I find it economically unconvincing in its central point.

3. Regulatory Competition as a Process of Search

There is another aspect of Sinn's reasoning that, in my view, introduces a bias for solutions with coordinated regulatory action and against system competition. Sinn's analysis of regulation is limited by the supposition that all necessary ingredients to quantitatively determine the socially optimal capital requirement are known. Furthermore, it assumes that this is the level of regulation actually chosen by governments, at least in the national context and under international cooperation.

In reality, however, the optimal capital adequacy requirement may be quite difficult to determine. Beyond this, public-choice considerations may explain why actual regulatory decisions may deviate from socially optimal ones. If only for this reason, we should not dismiss the idea of system competition lightly.

Optimal regulatory solutions are difficult to establish even in theory. They depend on how we view banks and their role in the economy, and how we model the external effects on society that are possibly associated with their activities. Sinn's analysis is based on one particular example of such a view. In his model, if we take it literally, the optimal capital requirement is such that it "prevents the limited liability constraint from becoming operative" (Sinn 2003, equation 13 and subsequent discussion). Thus, equity has to be large enough to cover the bank's outstanding debt obligations under all possible realizations of investment returns. This implies a very high level of capital, an implication that lets Sinn himself argue that "such a strict interpretation

of the model would make little sense” (Sinn 2003, footnote 18) and leads him to accept more generous solutions. But which ones precisely? Sinn is silent on this. So we are left with a very unclear answer as to the best level of capital requirement, even by Sinn in the context of his own model.

If we allow for alternative models, the answer becomes even more difficult. Gehrig (1995), a paper that is approvingly quoted by Sinn, actually emphasizes the ambiguous nature of the effects of bank capital requirements and the difficulty in evaluating their desirability.

This uncertainty about the theoretically correct level of regulation, along with considerations of public choice, creates vast potentials for divergences between actual regulation and (socially) optimal regulation. This, if nothing else, is a solid reason for making regulatory regimes contestable by allowing a certain amount of regulatory competition. This is reinforced by the fact that a particular regulation, even if it is optimal at one time, may cease to remain optimal over time in a dynamic industry like the financial one.

Of course, these arguments in defense of competition in regulation do not imply that no inefficiencies could arise under a purely competitive approach. Such inefficiencies, if clearly perceived, might lead us to accept a certain amount of cooperation and minimal harmonization, e.g., as implied by the Basel Accords. My concern here is that relying too exclusively on cooperation and harmonization could result in even greater weaknesses.²

4. Modeling the Credit and Bank Intermediation Market

Finally, let me make a few remarks on Sinn’s formal model of the bank intermediation market. I find some aspects of the particular model formulation chosen by him peculiar. I mention this last, though, because I believe that the central behavioral feature Sinn wants to obtain from his model – the tendency towards excessive risktaking under limited liability and asymmetric information – is robust and would hold up under alternative model formulations as well. Nevertheless, I think that Sinn’s model is limited by these features.

A first point concerns the economic role of banks in the model. According to Sinn, this role is that of a “delegated monitor” for business investments (reflecting the presence of prohibitive costs of direct lending). This is basi-

² As Kane has reminded us, one possible way of looking at a system relying excessively on cooperation and harmonization is to interpret it as an attempt at the formation of an international cartel among regulators, with the purpose of protecting them from the unpleasant effects of international mobility of financial firms and their customers. The difficulty of arranging durable patterns of international regulatory cooperation then may reflect, above all, the usual difficulties inherent in forming and maintaining a worldwide cartel in any product (Kane 1991, p. 335).

cally as in Diamond (1984), but with the difference that the friction behind this delegation is not explicitly captured by the model, but just asserted, in contrast to Diamond. In another respect, however, Sinn's model is entirely different from Diamond's. In the latter, the consolidation of investment risks by the bank plays a central role, allowing the bank to offer risk consolidation services to its lenders, driving down the "delegation costs" implied by the indirect lending through banks to a level that makes intermediated lending feasible and attractive to all participants. In Sinn (2003), in contrast, banks do not diversify their lending across independent borrowers. Instead, each bank specializes in just one (type of) borrower. This means that the bank does not offer diversification services; rather, bank lenders (households) are assumed to produce these themselves by diversifying across the debt instruments issued by the various banks. What kind of banks are these? Sinn calls them "investment banks." But I am not sure that this captures what real-world investment banks do. I am also not convinced that the German *Hausbank* "comes close to this ideal" (Sinn 2003, p. 312). In terms of transactions and portfolio management costs, this credit-market arrangement would seem to amount to a highly complicated and costly one for lenders or households.

Secondly, it is worth pointing out that Sinn's capital requirement is not just that, but at the same time an asset allocation (or "liquidity") requirement, since his model allows the bank to invest equity capital in the safe asset only. This is different from real-world capital regulations, which typically just require the bank to finance a certain proportion of its risky assets with non-borrowed (equity) funds, without stipulating a particular form of investment for these funds.

Also, I see no reason why equity capital has to be introduced from the beginning in the form of a regulatory constraint. The special feature of his model that has probably led Sinn to employ such a formulation is that in his model, without the regulatory constraint, the bank would choose to hold no capital. This reflects the fact that in this model bank capital plays no positive role perceived by the banks themselves. In my view, this is an unattractive model feature. Models could be formulated that allowed for a positive role of bank capital recognized by banks themselves, be it as a signal of sound behavior, or be it as insurance against the potential costs of reorganization and restructuring associated with bankruptcy or imminent bankruptcy (Baltensperger 1972, 1980; Baltensperger and Milde 1987). Recent market developments have painfully demonstrated the beneficial effects of a high level of capital to the shareholders and managers of many firms, including in particular financial firms, suffering sorely from excessive levels of debt and low equity capital buffers. Well-capitalized firms with conservative debt exposures have stood up much better to the recent financial storms and the capital erosion resulting from declining asset values than firms with high debt

and low capital. A model that assigns a more meaningful economic role to bank capital would be more attractive, in my view, without changing the central behavioral results Sinn is looking for in order to conduct his subsequent analysis of system competition.

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Can National Banking Systems Compete?

A Comment on the Paper by Hans-Werner Sinn

Peter Spencer

Hans-Werner Sinn's paper raises important questions about the efficiency of international banking markets. His central proposition is that competition between systems of national bank regulation suffers from the same kind of market failure as the private banking market itself.

His basic argument is that good regulatory systems are expensive, but asymmetric information makes it hard to distinguish them from bad ones. Consequently, bad systems drive out the good in same way that bad products eliminate good ones in the well-known Akerlof (1970) model, resulting in an international race to the bottom. Sinn (2003) argues that this helps to explain the poor regulatory environment that precipitated the Asian banking crisis. However, in my view, his basic argument is not persuasive.

Financial products are credence goods: their quality is hard to discern both *ex ante* and *ex post*. To take the classic example, when an investment fund does well relative to the market, it is never entirely clear whether this is due to good management or good luck. In this situation, the well-known problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and *ex post* state verification are inevitable. Banks are special in that the deposit contract can lead to excessive risktaking, bank runs, and systemic threats (Spencer, 2000).

Sinn's model represents an investment banking system, which raises funds through time deposits or loans and lends them on to borrowers. The number of banks is fixed, allowing them to make supernormal profits.¹ Each bank chooses the rate at which it lends these funds on to borrowers. As in the model

1 There are problems with Sinn's model that would make me wary of using it for policy analysis. We are told that "there are a fixed number of competitive banks, which face an inelastic demand for funds" (Sinn 2003, p. 311–312). Surely what Sinn means is that banks act as pricetakers in the deposit market. Also, it is hard to see how changing the loan rate can affect the risk of lending and the expected return without affecting the quantity demanded by borrowers. This is certainly not consistent with adverse selection. It might result from moral hazard, yet we are also told (Sinn 2003, p. 311) that banks "possess the necessary information to monitor business firms and the power to enforce the efficient behavior of these firms." I do not find the arguments of footnote 12 convincing in this respect.

of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the expected probability of default increases with the loan rate. When the bank has limited liability, this gives it an incentive to undercapitalize and finance excessively risky projects. Bank regulation is designed to offset this tendency, by ensuring that banks are adequately capitalized.²

Depositors apparently cannot calculate the default probability of the individual bank, but can estimate the risk of the banking system as a whole and demand a premium rate that reflects this. This is a pooling equilibrium in which banks are indistinguishable and all face the same cost of funds, which reflects the reputation of the industry for quality.

As Sinn's equilibrium model makes clear, in the absence of regulation (and free entry to banking) these informational defects reduce producer rather than consumer surplus. There is a strong incentive towards self-regulation in this situation. If banks can use their expertise to eliminate their poorly capitalized fellows, this raises the quality and lowers the cost of funds, turning Akerlof's downward spiral into reverse (Spencer, 2000). Historically, studies of free (i.e., unregulated retail) banking systems suggest that banks could do this by restricting the membership of the clearing house. Interbank lending arguably plays a similar role in a modern system. Sinn's assumption that the number of banks is fixed suggests that producers have some means of regulating entry.

If depositors can assess bank default risk at the national level, Sinn shows that a bank capitalization rule can be used to replicate the optimum that obtains under unlimited liability. It does this by inducing the banks to set the loan rate at the level that obtains with unlimited liability, avoiding excessive risktaking. (Self-regulation would also help raise profits in this situation.) However, he goes on to argue that this scenario is not convincing because it contradicts the "Selection Principle": governments concentrate their regulatory efforts on markets that have failed. This is the crux of his argument.

The problem with this proposition is quite simply that regulators do not concentrate their efforts on the investment banking markets, which are the focus of Sinn's model. Wholesale depositors are normally left to look after themselves under *caveat emptor*. Indeed, the market that conforms most closely to the structure of Sinn's model is the Eurodollar market, which is

2 However, this literature neglects the possibility of applying nonfinancial sanctions for bad performance. As Sinn (1983) puts it when he derives the gamble for resurrection: with unlimited liability and undercapitalization "you can't get blood out of a stone." Diamond (1984) shows that if nonfinancial penalties are available, then the moral hazard (and the *ex post* state verification) problem can be avoided even with zero capitalization. Diamond assumes, in contrast to Sinn, that loan risks are completely diversifiable. However, similar results have been obtained without this assumption by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1990) and others.

not regulated, or at best self-regulated. Regulators can admittedly set dedicated capital levels for the marketmaking and trading activities of investment banks, but these activities do not feature in his model.

In fact, governments focus their efforts on the *retail* banking market, which offers instant-access deposits and – some would argue – is prone to bank runs and systemic collapse if left unregulated. But Sinn does not claim to model such systems. Consequently, his “Selection Principle” does not tell us whether international bank lenders can assess risk at the national level. This remains an open and interesting question.

In addressing this issue, Sinn suggests that depositors could infer a country’s default risk from its banking legislation (Sinn 2003, p. 321), and he shows that this would lead to an efficient equilibrium in systems competition. However, he is dismissive of this line of argument. He also notes (Sinn 2003, p. 309) that depositors could get “some idea of the frequency of bank failures in general and the amounts normally repaid in such events.” This idea is built into his equilibrium model, determining the deposit rate in the pooling equilibrium. However, it is hardly a great leap of the imagination to suppose that investors could get an idea of the frequency of bank failures in a national system. Indeed, the rational-expectations hypothesis would dictate such an outcome in long-run equilibrium.

There is evidence that wholesale depositors can distinguish different regulatory systems, suggesting that regulators can avoid a race to the bottom. For example, the Eurodollar market is centered in London with its system of light self-regulation rather than centers like Grand Cayman with practically no regulation at all. That is not to say that the system is perfect. Evidently, there have been problems in Mexico, East Asia, and more recently Argentina. However, many would argue that these problems are primarily the result of the moral hazard in the international financial system that results from IMF bailouts, rather than an inability of international investors to assess risk differentials.

Modern retail banking systems are of course characterized by government deposit insurance, which lifts the risk from depositors and places it with the government. It is clearly in the government’s interest to supervise these systems effectively, so Sinn’s arguments about the ability of depositors to assess default risk are not relevant here. Whether or not governments can regulate these systems remains another open question. Arguably, the U.S. savings & loan debacle, which is mentioned in the paper (Sinn 2003, p. 309), was a failure of the retail deposit market and does not tell us much about the viability of the wholesale deposit markets. Moreover, because the taxpayer picks up the bill when things go wrong, this naturally pits the banks against the government and gives them a clear incentive to lobby for an easing of the regulatory burden (Sinn 2003, p. 320). An alternative explanation of this kind

of lobbying – to the extent that it occurs – is that the initial level of regulation could simply be too high: the London Eurodollar example suggests that in the absence of deposit insurance banks would not want zero regulation but light regulation.

It remains possible that Sinn is right in saying that international depositors do not have the expertise to distinguish between different banking systems. Then I would expect international banks to use their expertise to try and monitor their fellows and exclude them from the international banking markets, just as they did in free-banking systems. But in my view the jury is still out.

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Asymmetric Information, Bank Failures, and the Rationale for Harmonizing Banking Regulation

A Rejoinder on Comments of Ernst Baltensperger and Peter Spencer

Hans-Werner Sinn

I am grateful for the two critical comments by Ernst Baltensperger and Peter Spencer, which have added to the debate on an important issue. My rejoinder is as follows.

When the Basel Committee developed rules for harmonized banking supervision, they did not believe that systems competition would itself be able to ensure an efficient system of prudence regulation in the various countries. Harmonization is the opposite of systems competition, and those who advocate harmonization mistrust the forces of systems competition. This includes the EU, which has already declared that it will adopt the Basel II rules that are currently being developed, as well as all the other countries that are likely to adopt the new Basel rules.

When Rudi Dornbusch (2003) gave his Munich Lectures in 1998, he argued that financial fragility was the reason for the vulnerability of the Asian economies and a prerequisite for the Asian crisis of 1997. He attributed the financial fragility of the Asian countries to a “deliberate lack of regulation, supervision and transparency,” which induced financial agents to neglect the value at risk and to take gambles. Dornbusch argued that the IMF should, in future, act as an international supervisory authority making its loans dependent on countries’ sticking to common guidelines for effective prudence regulation, and he poked fun at the “liberation theologians” who believe in *laissez-faire* solutions for government actions.

Given these demands for collective supervisory and harmonizing activities, my question simply was what the possible rationale for such demands might be. If systems competition among bank regulators worked, there would be no need for collective actions. Thus my task was to isolate possible causes of inefficiency in systems competition and not to find conditions under which systems competition would work.

My critics do not find this task legitimate. They simply deny that there is a problem. As there is no problem, no solution needs to be sought, and

my article is superfluous. Systems competition works because financial investors are well informed and are able to distinguish between the regulatory systems of single countries. A country has no scope to neglect its regulatory tasks behind the back of the investors. Yes, admittedly, there was an Asian crisis, but it resulted from bad IMF policies rather than a failure of systems competition – a view strongly objected to by Dornbusch, by the way.

I find this kind of reasoning frustrating, because it discourages theoretical papers on problems before their empirical validity has been ultimately decided. For me a prior suspicion is enough justification to design a theory that can then be tested. Dornbusch, the Basel Committee, and the EU, for that matter, believe there is a problem with systems competition; they justified my suspicion. This is enough motivation even if Baltensperger and Spencer see no problem.

In fact, I do not share their optimism, because I find it absurd to assume that savers, even financial investors, can *fully* monitor country-specific regulatory systems. Understanding one's own national regulatory system is a burdensome task in itself, given that regulation consists not only of fixing a minimum equity requirement, as set up in the simple model, but of specifying many detailed supervisory rules for alternative kinds of banking business. How much more complicated is it to overlook a large number of far distant countries that have encoded their laws in foreign languages, that act according to unwritten cultural laws, and that differ in particular in the degree of strictness with which they implement the written laws! How small must the windows in one's ivory tower be for one to believe that there is no asymmetric information in the "market" for regulatory constraints!

The European mortgage-backed securities market is a good example of the ignorance that prevails in practice. The market is dominated by the German *Pfandbrief*, which covers three-quarters of the total. The *Pfandbrief* is a nearly perfectly safe asset, because German regulation is extremely strict, backing its value with first-rate real estate collateral priced at about 40% below the market values. Since the introduction of the euro, the *Pfandbrief* has been facing the competition of many incomplete imitations from other countries, which definitely incur higher risks without having to offer higher rates of return for the investors. In view of the market's ignorance of the true risks involved, the pressure on the German supervisory agencies has been increasing to also allow the German banks to carry out more risky and profitable investment with the funds they received, and the public debate about how to widen the scope of international investment activities has already begun. I fail to see another reason for this alarming process than the competition of laxity that I have modeled.

Spencer argues that experience rating would be a realistic opportunity to assess the country-specific differences in regulation. As investors can observe

country-specific frequencies of bank failure, they know about the quality of regulation. Baltensperger adds that monitoring is easy because there are specialists doing it and because country-specific regulatory rules do not change frequently. These arguments are unconvincing in that if they were true, the Asian crisis could never have happened. At least, the crisis could not have resulted from financial fragility and a deliberate neglect of financial regulation, as Dornbusch and many other observers have claimed.

But the financial fragility was there, and even the international supervisory agencies like Moody's and Standard & Poor's had not been able to warn the investors in time of the meltdown that happened, just as they had proved unable to warn the investors of the savings & loan debacles or the failure of WorldCom and Enron. This indeed suggests that there was a substantial scope for unobservable policy actions. Monitoring banks and financial institutions is extremely difficult even for experts. True, investors were able to observe the previous performance of Asian banks, but that would not have helped them detect weaknesses in the national regulatory systems with regard to systemic, correlated risks, whose implications are rarely observable. The meltdown of national banking systems that occurred around 1989 was not a repetitive event in a country's history whose observation would have allowed the assessment of probabilities on the basis of actual frequencies. There will be no further meltdown in the Asian tiger countries for the time being, but banking crises will continue to pop up at other, unforeseen places in the world, as they used to do in the past.

The year 2002 is the year of the most severe crisis of financial capitalism in the postwar period in the U.S. and Western Europe. This crisis, too, has not been prevented by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and we can only hope that it will not develop into something like the Asian crisis on a larger scale.

Spencer argues that if there were a monitoring problem of the kind I describe, then banks would help themselves. International banks would try to monitor their unsound fellows closely and would exclude them from the international banking markets if their respective national regulation were not tight enough. This is the well-known Panglossian view of the world. God designed the nose optimally, and it cannot be improved by a surgeon. If this analogy were true in the market economy, we would not need national food agencies to monitor and control hazardous ingredients because firms would help themselves by banning their reckless competitors from the market, and we would not need a national banking regulation because the banks would regulate themselves. What about the transaction costs of doing so? Regulatory activities that avoid the gamble for resurrection are public goods that are not easily provided by private agents. Only centralized, collective actions are able to internalize the externalities, but it is very difficult to bring such actions about.

Setting up the Basel Committee and implementing its recommendations via directives from Brussels and via national laws is such a centralized action. True, it was the banks themselves that wanted the Basel II rules to increase their profits, as I explained in the paper, and they contributed to their formulation. However, the Basel II rules would be useless without being enforced by government actions. Anyone who welcomes the Basel II rules must implicitly assume that unbridled systems competition would be a problem.

I am willing to admit, of course, that financial investors have *some* possibilities to monitor regulatory systems; they are not completely ignorant. Reality is between two theoretical extremes:

- (i) investors cannot observe any differences between the countries; and
- (ii) investors can perfectly observe the differences between the countries.

Clearly, the relationship between some countries is closer to case (i), and that between others is closer to case (ii). My critics come from London and Switzerland. Undoubtedly, these places have been successful players in systems competition, even able to build up brand names based on tough national regulation. There was a reward for these countries, in interest rates, for establishing the reputation of being tough. I fail to see, however, why this observation should imply that financial investors were able to distinguish between Thailand and Malaysia, or Indonesia, Korea, and Japan, and I doubt that they will be able to distinguish between Botswana, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, to pick three countries that have not been in the center of interest so far. My example of the European mortgage-backed securities market suggested that financial investors were even unable to distinguish between various European countries. The fact that there are products with brand names does not logically or practically exclude the possibility that there is a lemon competition between no-name products. The producers of brand names of course do not like the idea that their competitors will use regulatory measures to improve the quality of their products.

Baltensperger unfortunately gives the impression that I treat only case (i) in the paper. He accuses me of “simply not allowing for (the) possibility” that savers or financial investors could monitor national regulatory policies. However, this is not true (and was not true in earlier versions of my paper). On p. 321 I also deal explicitly with case (ii) and devote one paragraph to showing that competition works perfectly in this case. I did not make this case a proposition, since I found it intellectually uninteresting, not contributing to explaining the frequent financial crises we have seen in recent years. Nevertheless, to ensure that it can no longer be overlooked, let me now state the case more explicitly:

Proposition 4a Suppose international investors can perfectly monitor national regulatory rules and correctly infer what they mean for the risktaking of national banks. Then countries will implement the efficient solvency rules, and the invisible hand of systems competition works well.

Proof. Already given in Sinn (2003a, p. 321).

Admittedly, I did not formally treat the intermediate case where some monitoring, albeit not perfect, is possible. But this was for the sake of simplicity only, and it does not affect the conclusions. Unless *perfect* monitoring is possible, there is at least some scope for country gains by choosing overly lax regulation and imposing a negative policy externality on other countries, and hence the conclusion that systems competition will be too lax if banks are owned by domestic residents while foreigners are among the lenders remains valid. This is, in fact, a robust conclusion that should survive quite a number of model variations, including the ones that Baltensperger suggests. Actually, he admits that himself in his first paragraph, which deals with the formal aspects of the model.

Interestingly enough, Baltensperger argues that the benefits of tough regulation will be “at least to a certain extent recognizable to bank lenders” and that the winner in a deregulation race will therefore not be the country with the most relaxed standard. I am surprised at his saying this, because it suggests that my model implies a race to the bottom and that his assumption implies efficient regulatory competition. The truth is that my model generates an interior solution in the realistic case where there are both foreign bank owners and foreign lenders. Thus, the country with the most relaxed standard does not, in fact, win out, but nevertheless there is underregulation in systems competition. This feature will definitely remain true if we assume that the benefits of tough regulation are only to a certain extent recognizable to bank lenders. As long as the benefits are only partially recognizable, as Baltensperger seems to admit, there is the international policy externality resulting from asymmetric information that distorts the equilibrium in systems competition towards excessive laxity.

I should mention that the conclusion also emerges when my model is interpreted in terms of a time-consistency story. Suppose there is no asymmetric information, but loan contracts are long-run, while both banks and regulatory agents are able to change their risktaking behavior and equity choices after the contracts have been made. Savers or financial investors perfectly anticipate the banks’ and the regulators’ behavior, but the impossibility of renegotiating implies that changes in the banks’ risktaking with limited liability will nevertheless impose a marginal externality on savers. This would be an extension of the approach chosen by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a remark that I made in the first version of the paper submitted

but deleted to satisfy the space limitations imposed by the editor. As was shown in a comment by Dominique Demougin at the annual meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik, all equations and all conclusions would go through in this case, when the equilibrium conditions are interpreted as applying to the *ex ante* phase where the contracts are made, and the other marginal conditions to the *ex post* optimization of banks and governments. In particular, there would again be a competition in laxity of the kind I described. I chose not to emphasize this possibility because I found that the repeated nature of loan contracting that characterizes reality places more emphasis on the asymmetric-information interpretation. Still, this interpretation is an important one that should be taken into account.

I agree with what Ernst Baltensperger says on the general possibility that collective agencies such as governments – or Basel committees, for that matter – may themselves make mistakes. We have all sung this tune many times. I see no point in repeating it whenever I write on systems competition, and I can only refer my readers to chapter 1 of my book on systems competition, where such issues are discussed at length (Sinn 2003). The failure of systems competition is, of course, not a sufficient condition for government actions. However, it is a necessary one.

Both commentators make a couple of constructive remarks on technical aspects of the model. I appreciate these remarks and certainly agree that richer banking models could be constructed that incorporate the other aspects of bank decisions, in particular those that would explain the useful functions of bank equity capital. However, richer models are more complicated and burden the reader with more mathematics. It is my understanding of good theorizing that one keeps models as simple as possible to capture the effect one wants to study, rather than aiming for completeness. With a higher formal density, I could easily produce an interior equity choice even without regulation by introducing bankruptcy costs, derive the equilibrium with banks that diversify over a certain number of clients (instead of only one per bank), or allow for the volume of funds being optimized in addition to risktaking. All my assumptions here are innocuous, aiming at simplicity only. As the ingredients I chose are sufficient to produce an interior solution in systems competition (which the critics overlook), I did not need more complicated assumptions than the ones I chose. Nevertheless I would of course welcome extensions of the kind the commentators suggest.

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